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NOTES
Should Kentucky Impose an
Enforceable Duty on Lawyers to Report
Other Lawyers' Professional Misconduct?
BY PARKER D. EASTIN*
INTRODUCTION
While playing in a golf tournament with Friend, Harold Adams
recently learned that James Black a fellow member of the bar, had
misallocated a portion ofthefunds obtained from a settlement agreement
that Black had negotiated on behalfofFriend. Adams was not surprised,
as Black's reputation for deceitfulness preceded him.
Adams, who was not asked to pursue the matter on behalf ofFiend,
felt obliged to confront Black Black took the accusation as a tremendous
insult. "Look Adams, mind your own business. I handle my clients my
way! You should spend more time worrying about all the clients you
neglect in pursuit of a better handicap and a better buzz. We both know
you're an alcoholic, and you spend more time on the golf course than in
your office. That's whyyou're always askingfor extensions and continu-
ances."
A  ssuming all of the above accusations are true, what is either
4.. lawyer's obligation with respect to this information? Has
.Lkeither attorney done anything that would subject him to
professional discipline? Should either attorney be responsible for reporting
the misconduct of the other?
For attorneys practicing in Kentucky, there is no recognized duty to
report the professional misconduct of other attorneys and no potential
discipline for failing to do so.' This holds true even though both Adams and
J.D. expected 2000, University of Kentucky.
'See infra Part I.
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Black have knowledge that the other has breached his professional
obligations. Is this the best possible state of affairs? Or has the time come
for the Kentucky Supreme Court to impose a reporting requirement on the
lawyers practicing in this state? To answer this question, a determination
must be made as to whether ample justification exists to support the
Kentucky Supreme Court's decision not to require lawyers to regulate
themselves in this manner. Lawyers in forty-eight other states have
imposed upon themselves a dutyto report unprivileged information relating
to professional misconduct. Kentucky, therefore, is only one of two states
which do not compel such disclosure.2 As one commentator recently noted,
however, "[t]he disclosure of unethical or illegal attorney conduct is an
integral part of the legal profession's ability to police itself, maintain its
integrity and protect society from harm."3 Ultimately, "it is lawyers them-
selves who are often in the best, and sometimes the only, position to
discover, recognize and report unethical activities within the profession
before members of the public are seriously harmed."4
Part I of this Note provides an overview of the lawyer's reporting
requirement, including a historical summary ofthe origin and development
of the lawyer's duty to report professional misconduct.5 Also included in
Part I is a discussion of the general status of the reporting requirement,6
especially in light of the landmark decision by the Illinois Supreme Court
in the case of In re Himmel.7 Part II provides an overview of the current
reporting requirement in Kentucky, or more precisely, the lack thereof, and
examines some of the potential justifications for this position.8 Part II also
discusses some relevant reporting statistics from Kentucky. Part III
highlights potential problem areas under the current reporting requirement
found in the Model Rules of Professional Conduct9 and proposes potential
solutions to these problems. 10 Part III also includes a discussion of the
ramifications of imposing a reporting requirement on lawyers practicing in
2 The other state with no official reporting requirement is California.
3Anthony J. Blackwell, Wieder's Paradox: ReportingLegalMisconduct in Law
Firms, in 1992/1993 ANN. SuRv. AM. L. 9,9 (citing Winters v. Houston Chronicle
Publ'g Co., 795 S.W. 2d 723, 729-31 (Tex. 1990) (Doggett, J., concurring)).
4 1d.
'See infra notes 14-40 and accompanying text.
" See infra notes 41-66 and accompanying text.
7 In re Himmel, 533 N.E.2d 790 (Ill. 1988).
8 See infra notes 67-93 and accompanying text.
9 See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 8.3(a) (1998).
" See infra notes 94-140 and accompanying text.
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private firms after the decision in Wieder v. Skala," as well as those
serving in the judiciary. 2 Finally, this Note concludes that Kentucky should
adopt and enforce the reporting requirement as enumerated in the Model
Rules of Professional Conduct, but in doing so, should pay close attention
to the potential for abuse by unscrupulous lawyers.
3
I. THE DUTY TO REPORT PROFESSIONAL MISCONDUCT
A. The Historical Development of the Duty to Report
The responsibility incumbent upon a lawyer to report the misconduct
of another lawyer has existed for nearly a century. 4 The duty officially
arose in 1908, when the American Bar Association ("ABA") published the
first national code of legal ethics, known as the Canons of Professional
Ethics ("Canons").15 The Canons consisted of thirty-two norms of behavior
for legal practice. 6
Canon 29, entitled "Upholding the Honor of the Profession," declared:
"Lawyers should expose without fear or favor before the proper tribunals
corrupt or dishonest conduct in the profession, and should accept without
hesitation employment against a member of the Bar who has wronged his
client."'7 The Canons, therefore, encouraged intraprofessional reporting and
prosecution of corruption and dishonesty in the bar, but they were all bark
and no bite. The Canons did not impose an actual duty per se to report
misconduct, as the preamble to the Canons noted that the expressions
contained therein were not to be considered binding and instead were to be
" Wieder v. Skala, 544 N.Y.S.2d 971 (Sup. Ct. 1989), aff'd, 562 N.Y.S.2d 930
(App. Div. 1990), aff'd as modified, 609 N.E.2d 105 (N.Y. 1992).
'2 See infra notes 141-75 and accompanying text.
13 See infra notes 176-80 and accompanying text.
" See William L. Hutton, Case Note, The Lawyer's Duty to Report Another
Lawyer's Misconduct, 14 S. ILL. U. L.J. 683, 684 (1990).
15 CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS (1908).
16 See Eugene R. Gaetke, Kentucky's New Rules ofProfessional Conduct for
Lawyers, 78 KY. L.L 767, 768 (1990) (noting that between 1908 and 1970, 15
additional Canons were added by the ABA).
17 CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS Canon 29 (stating that lawyers "should
strive at all times to uphold the honor and maintain the dignity of the profession
and to improve not only the law but the administration of justice"). But see id.
Canon 28 ("Stirring up strife and litigation is not only unprofessional, but it is
indictable at common law.").
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used as a kind of"general guide."18 Thus, attorneys who failed to honor this
"obligation" were not subject to discipline for their nonfeasance. Interest-
ingly, the ABA Canons remained the national professional model for more
than sixty years.19
Subsequently, in 1969, the ABA adopted the Model Code of Profes-
sional Responsibility ("Model Code"). 20 The Model Code was designed
to be more specific in application than its predecessor and was
"adopted almost universally by state supreme courts."' The Model Code
consisted of both non-binding "Ethical Considerations" and binding
"Disciplinary Rules." In contrast to the Canons, the Model Code's
Disciplinary Rule ("DR") 1-103 made the duty to report a binding
professional obligation rather than a mere suggestion?23 DR 1-103(A)
provides: "A lawyer possessing unprivileged knowledge of a violation of
DR 1-102 shall report such knowledge to a tribunal or other authority
empowered to investigate or act upon such violation."24 The incorporation
of DR 1-102 is a clear indication of the magnitude of this requirement?
DR 1-102 provides:
(A) A lawyer shall not:
(1) Violate a Disciplinary Rule.
(2) Circumvent a Disciplinary Rule through actions of another.
(3) Engage in illegal conduct involving moral turpitude.
(4) Engage in conduct involving dishonestly, fraud, deceit, or mis-
representation.
(5) Engage in conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of
justice.
'8Blackwell, supra note 3, at 23.
19 In 1969, the ABA's House of Delegates established a new set of rules be-
cause of the "difficulty in enforcing the aspirational and precatory language of the
Canons." Gaetke, supra note 15, at 768.20 MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY (1969).
21 THoMAs D. MORGAN & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, PROBLEMS AND MATERIALS
ON PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY 51 (6th ed. 1995).
' The Model Code made clear that Disciplinary Rules were not "aspirational"
but were the minimum standard of conduct expected of lawyers. A violation of a
Disciplinary Rule subjected the lawyer to discipline. See MODEL CODE OF
PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 1-102(A)(1).
' See Blackwell, supra note 3, at 23.
24 MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 1-103(A).
' See Ronald D. Rotunda, The Lawyer's Duty to Report Another Lawyer's
Unethical Violations in the Wake ofHimmel, 1988 U. ILL. L. REV. 977, 981.
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(6) Engage in any other conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness
to practice law.26
Thus a lawyer has a sweeping obligation under the Model Code to report
ethical violations. A lawyer possessing unprivileged knowledge of a
violation of a specific Disciplinary Rule, coupled with the knowledge of a
violation of any of several "moral" rules, is encumbered with a strictly
enforceable duty to report?7
Legal commentators roundly criticized the Model Code's formulation
of the duty to report.2 The broad imposition of the duty to report even "de
minimis or merely technical infractions," it was argued, would serve only
to engender "mutual suspicion and distrust" in the profession. 9 Further-
more, this absolute duty wouldneverbe followed, thus fostering even more
cynicism with regard to attorney misconduct in general.
30
In August 1983, prompted by a general dissatisfaction with the Model
Code,31 the ABA adopted the Model Rules of Professional Conduct
32
("Model Rules"), which were intended to replace the entire Model Code.33
26 MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 1-102.
27 In 1972, the ABA issued Informal Opinion 1210, noting that the duty of a
lawyer underDisciplinary Rule 1-103 (a) was to report any unprivileged knowledge
of another lawyer's violation of Disciplinary Rule 1-102. See ABA Comm. on
Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Informal Op. 1210 (1972).
1 See Blackwell, supra note 3, at 24 ("Among the criticisms was the practical
impossibility of separating the Ethical Considerations from the Disciplinary Rules
in terms of their binding effect") (citing GEOFFREY C. HAZARD & W. WILLIAM
HODES, THE LAW OF LAWYERING: A HANDBOOK ON THE MODEL RULES OF
PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT 555-56 (1989 Supp.)); see also Gaetke, supra note 16,
at 769 ("The Code was not without its problems. The ABA amended the Code
every year between 1974 and 1980 in response to judicial and scholarly
criticism.").29Blackwell, supra note 3, at 24.
3oSee id.; see also Gaetke, supra note 16, at 797 n.176 (noting that there was
not a single case prosecuted in Kentucky under DR 1-103(A)).
31 See Gaetke, supra note 16, at 769-70.
32 MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT (1983).
33 See Larry Schafer, Comment, Attorney and Client: Duty to Report Lawyer
Misconduct, 67 N.D. L. REV. 359, 361 (1991). See generally Gaetke, supra note
16, at 770 (noting that the initial "reaction" to the Model Rules was not nearly as
overwhelming as the previous response to the Model Code); MORGAN &ROTUNDA,
supra note 21, at 12 (noting, however, that as of 1995 a majority of states have
adopted in substantial part the Model Rules).
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The Model Rules have a black-letter format and are followed by explana-
tory "Comments." However, only the Rules themselves are designed to
have authoritative effect, while the comments are to be used to "provide
guidance" in the application of the Rules.3"
The duty to report professional misconduct under the Model Rules is
markedly different from the duty under the Model Code.35 Under Model
Rule 8.3(a), the duty to report arises only when a lawyer has "knowledge
that another lawyer has committed a violation of the Rules of Professional
Conduct that raises a substantial question as to that lawyer's honesty,
trustworthiness or fitness as a lawyer in other respects." 36 As emphasized,
only violations which raise a "substantial question" as to a lawyer's fitness
to practice law are to be reported. This means that the duty to report
misconduct is triggered at a much higher threshold than under the previous
Model Code formulation.
The Model Rules version of the duty to report, although clearly more
sound than its Model Code predecessor, leaves many questions unan-
swered.37 For example, what violations raise "substantial questions" about
a lawyer's fitness to practice law?38 Apparently, it is left to the individual
lawyer's discretion to decide what types of misconduct raise this "substan-
tial question." '39 Moreover, should attorneys who fail to honor the obliga-
tionto report be subject to discipline absent other professional misconduct?
The extent to which any formulation of the reporting rule should or would
be independently enforced (i.e., uncoupled with other professional
misconduct) was uncertain-uncertain, that is, until the landmark decision
by the Illinois Supreme Court in In re Himmel.4°
3' Gaetke, supra note 16, at 771 (noting that format of the Model Rules was
similar to that of the Restatements produced, by the American Law Institute, and
that the comments were designed to "illuminate" the "interpretation and
application" of the Rules).
35 See Schafer, supra note 33, at 363; see also John Freeman, ReportingLawyer
Misconduct, S.C. LAW., May-June 1994, at 7, 8 (discussing the difference between
Model Code reporting requirement and the Model Rules reporting requirement).
36 MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 8.3(a) (1998) (emphasis
added).
37 See discussion infra Part iI.
38 See discussion infra Part III.A.2.
39 See Michael J. Burwick, Note, YouDirtyRat! ModelRule 8.3 andMandatory
Reporting ofAttorney Misconduct, 8 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 137, 137-38 (1994).
40 In re Himmel, 533 N.E.2d 790 (Ill 1988); see infra notes 41-66 and accom-
panying text.
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B. The Importance of In re Himmel
In re Himmel4' is a very significant case, as it represents the first case
in which a lawyer was chargedsolely with failing to report the professional
misconduct of another lawyer.42 A brief review of the facts will help bring
the significance of the holding to light,43 and one should keep in mind that
DR 1-103 was in effect in Illinois at this time." In October 1978, Tammy
Forsberg was injured in a motorcycle accident and retained John Casey as
her attorney in a suit to recover for personal injuries.45 Mr. Casey negoti-
ated a $35,000 settlement on behalf of Ms. Forsberg, but he failed to
deliver Ms. Forsberg's two-thirds share of the funds and instead converted
them to his own personal use.' Over the next two years, Ms. Forsberg
made several unsuccessful attempts to recover her $23,233.34.17
In 1983, Ms. Forsberg hired attorney James Himmel, an eight-year
veteran of the profession, to help her in the collection of her funds.4 Mr.
Himmel agreed to represent her in the action and offered to collect as his
fee one-third of any monies recovered in excess of Ms. Forsberg's
$23,233.34 share.49 Mr. Himmel eventually negotiated with Mr. Casey a
$75,000 settlement under which Ms. Forsberg agreed not to pursue any
other claims she might have against him.50 Thereafter, Mr. Casey failed to
meet his obligations under the agreement, and Mr. Himmel then filed suit
and obtained a $100,000 judgment on behalf of Ms. Forsberg.5'
Because Ms. Forsberg had specifically directed him not to do so, Mr.
Himmel did not report Mr. Casey's actions to the Illinois disciplinary
4 In re Himmel, 533 N.E.2d at 790.
42 See Rotunda, supra note 25, at 982.
For a comprehensive discussion of the facts of Himmel, see id. at 982-85.
"One should not attach too much significance to the fact that this case was
prosecuted under the Model Code formulation since the misconduct in question
(the embezzlement of client funds) would have certainly risen to the level of a
"substantial" misconduct under the Model Rules. See infra Part ImlA.2.
" See In re Himmel, 533 N.E.2d at 791.
4' See id.
47 See id.
48 See id.
49 See id.
50See id. The agreement specified thatMs. Forsberg would not pursue any civil,
criminal, or disciplinary action against Casey.
"' See id. Ms. Forsberg was only able to collect $15,400 of this amount. Thus,
Mr. Himmel ultimately received no fee.
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authorities.5 2 As a result of the suit, however, the Illinois Attorney
Registration and Disciplinary Commission ("IARDC") became aware of
the allegations against Mr. Casey and initiated an investigation.' Mr.
Casey was subsequently disbarred on November 5, 1985.1 The IARDC
then began to look into Mr. Himmel's role in the proceedings. In January
1986, the administrator of the IARDC filed a complaint against Mr.
Himmel, alleging that he had violated Rule 1-103(a) of the Illinois Code of
Professional Responsibility.5 The Hearing Board subsequently found that
Mr. Himmel had violated the rule but recommended only a private
reprimand. 6 On appeal by the administrator, the Review Board found that
Mr. Himmel had not violated the rule and recommended dismissal of the
complaint.' Upon final appeal, the Illinois Supreme Court suspended Mr.
Himmel from the practice of law for one year, punishment merely for his
failure to report the misconduct of Mr. Casey."8
In re Himmel was a ground-breaking case in legal ethics.5 9 It was the
first case on record in which a disciplinary proceeding was instituted solely
forafailureto report professional misconduct ° Previous disciplinary cases
involving an alleged failure to report also involved allegations of additional
12 See id. Presumably, Ms. Forsberg did not want the misconduct to be reported
for fear of upsetting ongoing collection efforts.
53 See id.
54 See id.
5
1 See id. Rule 1-103(a) of the Illinois Rules of Professional Conduct provides:
"(a) A lawyer possessing unprivileged knowledge of a violation of Rule 1-
102(a)(3) or (4) shall report such knowledge to a tribunal or other authority
empowered to investigate or act upon such violation." ILLINOIS RULES OF
PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 103(a) (1987). Rule 1-102(a)(3) and (4) provides:
"(a) A lawyer shall not... (3) engage in illegal conduct involving moral turpitude;
(4) engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation."
Id. Rule 1-102(a)(3), (4).
56 See In re Himmel, 533 N.E.2d at 792.
7See id. The board recommended vindication because Mr. Himmel had
honored his client's wishes to not disclose the misconduct.
58 See id. at 796.
" Interestingly, Mr. Himmel was quoted as saying, "Frankly, I never really
thought of my obligations to the profession in this case .... I was just trying to help
a client to be made whole after being harmed by another member of my
profession." Darryl Van Duch, BestSnitches: llinois Lawyers, NAT'L L.J., Jan. 27,
1997, at A25.
I The decision also made clear that a lawyer may not bargain away the duty to
report professional misconduct in an attempt to obtain a better settlement for his
client. See Himmel, 533 N.E.2d at 796.
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ethical or legal misconduct.6" Whether or not one agrees with the outcome
of this particular case, the decision effectively demonstrates the potential
breadth of a reporting requirement that is strictly enforced.
Today, In re Himmel remains one of the few cases subjecting a lawyer
to discipline solely for failing to report another lawyer's professional
misconduct. Because very few states have followed the lead of the Illinois
Supreme Court, the long-term precedential effect of this decision remains
uncertain.62 In Illinois, however, the decision has been taken very seriously
by the legal community. In 198 8, the year In re Himmel was decided, only
154 attorneys reported the professional misconduct of their peers to the
IARDC.63 A year later, that number jumped to 992.6 Over the next five
years, an average of about 570 attorney complaints were received annually
by the agency, abenchmarkno other state has come close to approaching. 65
These numbers indicate that a strictly enforced reporting requirement can
cause lawyers to police themselves more fervently and abandon their
"'conspiracy of silence.'I
UI. KENTUCKY'S REPORTiNG STATUS
A. Kentucky's Current Rules Relating to the Reporting ofMisconduct
In July 1989, the Kentucky Supreme Court adopted the Model Rules
of Professional Conduct using a form of selective incorporation.67 As noted
61 See Rotunda, supra note 25, at 982.
62 See Burwick, supra note 39, at 146-47 ("In the wake of this decision, there
has been a great deal of commentary, but surprisingly few instances of other courts
and disciplinary bodies following the lead of the Illinois Supreme Court.").
63See Van Duch, supra note 59, at A25.
See id. But see Burwick, supra note 39, at 147. Burwick examined Illinois
reporting statistics in 1989 and noted that, ultimately, "there was no significant
change in the number of attorneys charged or disciplined before or after the
decision." Id. This implies that while the In reHimmel decision caused many more
lawyers to report professional misconduct the following year, much of the alleged
misconduct was not based on colorable claims.
I See Van Duch, supra note 59, atAl ("New York attorneys, for instance, have
reported only 'a handful' of colleagues to state authorities during the 1990s ... ").
11d. atA25; see also CynthiaL. Gendry, Comment, Ethics-AnAttorney'sDuty
to Report the Professional Misconduct of Co-workers, 18 S. ILL. U. L.J. 603, 609
(1994) ("Many legal scholars recommend more severe sanctions as a means of
advancing compliance with the reporting mandates. A drastic increase in reports
... by attorneys shortly after Himmel indicates the merit of this theory.").
67 See generally KY. SUP. CT. R.; Gaetke, supra note 16, at 767 ("On July 12,
1989, the Kentucky Supreme Court adopted its own version of the... Model Rules
1998-99] 1279
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above, the court chose not to incorporate the reporting requirement found
in Model Rule 8.3.68 Hence, Kentucky lawyers have no officially recog-
nized duty to report professional misconduct.69 This means that lawyers
practicing in Kentucky are not subject to discipline for failing to report the
professional misconduct of their colleagues no matter how improper or
egregious that misconduct might be.7°
Interestingly, the only rule that speaks directly to the issue of attorney
discipline for reporting professional misconduct is Kentucky's Rule 3.4(f),
which instructs a lawyer not to "[p]resent, participate in presenting, or
threaten to present criminal or disciplinary charges solely to obtain an
advantage in any civil or criminal matter."' 1 This rule rightly subjects
lawyers to discipline for the over-zealous use of either the criminal or
disciplinary process in order to gain a competitive edge.' Rule 3.4(f)
presumably has its roots in DR 7-105(A), which provides, "A lawyer shall
not present, participate in presenting, or threaten to present criminal
charges solely to obtain an advantage in a civil matter." However, Rule
3.4(f) is broader than its Model Code counterpart in a fundamental respect.
Rule 3.4(f) applies this prohibition to both civil and criminal matters,
which represents a more extensive prohibition than that of its apparent
predecessor in the Model Code.74
Combining the supreme court's decision not to incorporate the
reporting requirement of Model Rule 8.3 with the decision to expand the
scope of Rule 3.4(f), one could reasonably interpret this as sending a strong
message to the Kentucky bar. One can imagine the supreme court saying,
of Professional Conduct.").6 Seesupra Introduction. The court altered and omitted several other provisions
as well. See generally Gaetke, supra note 16, at 774-800.69 Lawyers remain free to come forward based upon their own convictions.
70 See generally Gaetke, supra note 16, at 796 ("Even more disturbing than the
deletion of Model Rule 3.3(a)(3) is the Kentucky Supreme Court's deletion of the
requirement that lawyers report serious ethical violations committed by other
lawyers.").
71 KY. SUP. Cr. R. 3.130-3.4(f). Interestingly, the Model Rules contain no such
provision. See Gaetke, supra note 16, at 781.
72 See Gaetke, supra note 16, at 781 ("Prohibitions on such threats and actions
... are justifiable on several grounds.").
73 MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-105(A) (1980); see
also Gaetke, supra note 16, at 781 (noting that 3.4(f) is "similar to a proscription
under the [Model] Code").
74See Gaetke, supra note 16, at 781.
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"Not only are we refusing to require lawyers to report the professional
misconduct of their colleagues, we are willing to discipline those lawyers
who file or threaten to file complaints that we believe are being pursued
solely for ulterior motives."
B. Potential Justifications for Kentucky's Position
Why would the court adopt such a defensive posture, especially when
forty-eight other states have not found it necessary to do so? There are
several possible justifications, but whether or not these justifications are
satisfactory is arguable. The expansive wording of Rule 3.4(f) and the
absence of the Model Rules' reporting requirement confirm that one of the
court's primary fears is that lawyers will abuse a reporting requirement in
order to gain a competitive advantage in litigation. The court apparently
fears that subsequent to the adoption of a reporting requirement, lawyers
would file or threaten to file charges against other lawyers for malevolent
reasons and would attempt to do so under the guise of adherence to the
rule. This fear seemingly represents a strong argument against the
imposition of a reporting requirement.75 However, there is no empirical
data to support the contention that lawyers would seize the opportunity to
abuse the system in this manner,76 and this notion seems to presume a sort
of ever-present scienter in the minds of Kentucky lawyers. Furthermore,
there is no obvious reason why Rule 3.4(f) could not effectively comple-
ment any reporting requirement the court chooses to adopt. In other words,
these two rules are not necessarily mutually exclusive.'7
Opponents could also argue that the uncertainty inherent in Model Rule
8.3's language of "substantial question," and the necessarily subjective
determination which must therefore be made by each lawyer, make the
rule's adoption that much more problematic.78 As this Note demonstrates,
75 As Professor Gaetke notes, "The Kentucky rule... serves a valuable public
interest function in discouraging the misuse of criminal and disciplinary charges
for private gain." Id.
76 The author has at least found no such statistical data. However, in 1990, the
Illinois Supreme Court adopted a rule similar to Kentucky's Rule 3.4(f), making
it unethical to threaten to snitch during pending civil litigation "because too many
of the state's lawyers were using skeletons in their opponents' closets to gain
negotiation leverage." Van Duch, supra note 59, at A25.
7 See also infra Part I.A.5 (arguing that 3.4(f) is defectively drafted).78See infra Part III.
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however, much of the confusion surrounding Model Rule 8.3 can be
clarified by the adoption of a carefully articulated rule.79
Opponents might also argue that the decision to report a fellow member
of the bar should "stem from an attorney's own moral convictions rather
than an attempt to determine whether another individual's actions fall
within the reporting requirements of a specific statutory provision." 80 While
this appeal to the conscience of lawyers rings true in an idealistic judicial
system, lawyers need clear guidelines and enforceable rules to function
most effectively.
A final justification against the imposition of a duty to report is that
there is a general distaste for snitching and its encouragement, both in and
out of the legal profession. Though this may be true, the unfortunate
decline in public respect for lawyers over the last several decades should
cause the court to adopt proactive measures that will likely decrease the
amount of lawyer misconduct that led to much ofthis criticism.82 Similarly,
such a move by the court would be an intelligent public relations maneuver,
as it would demonstrate to the public that the legal profession strives for
improvement over the status quo. Furthermore, the adoption of a reporting
requirement, substantiatedby the threat of disciplinary proceedings, makes
reporting seem less like snitching and more like adherence to a recognized
rule of law.3 As a practical matter as well, "[a]mong the various partici-
pants in the legal process, lawyers are the most informed regarding legal
79 See infra Part I]I.
1o Burwick, supra note 39, at 153.
81 See id.
82 See Gaetke, supra, note 16, at 797 ("From the public's viewpoint, the absence
of a reporting requirement undermines the effectiveness of the planned operation
of the disciplinary process.").
83 As Professor Gaetke states:
Some insist that the requirement places lawyers in the awkward position of
having to judge the conduct of their opponents and even their colleagues.
Yet lawyers are quite willing to "judge" other lawyers for any number of
purposes as long as it serves their own private interests or those of their
clients. They judge the legality of their opponents' discovery demands.
They judge opposing lawyers' conduct for purposes of appeals from lower
court decisions. They judge actions taken by opponents for purposes of
pursuing sanctions. All these judgments involve the lawyer's evaluation of
whether another lawyer's conduct comports with the law. The reporting
requirement of Model Rule 8.3 merely expects such judgments to further
the public interest.
Id. at 799 (footnotes omitted).
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ethics and the most likely to be aware of the misconduct of lawyers in-
volved in a given matter. Thus, lawyers collectively are the best source of
informed complaints about lawyers' misconduct."" Therefore, since law-
yers are the best, and sometimes the only, participants in the process capa-
ble of making these determinations, it seems illogical to excuse them from
the responsibility of serving the profession in this capacity. Ultimately,
arguments against the imposition of a reporting requirement in Kentucky
exist, but can they overcome the arguments in favor of such a duty?
C. Kentucky Statistics on Lawyer Discipline
The following statistics, provided by the Kentucky Bar Association's
Office of Bar Counsel, represent the three most recent fiscal years (1995-
1998), as well as 1989, the fiscal year following the decision in In re
Himmel. 5 The numbers shown reflect the following information:
1. The number of lawyers licensed to practice in the state of Kentucky.
2. The number of disciplinary complaints filed against these lawyers. s6
3. The number of complaints which led to disciplinary proceedings.
4. The number of complaints which resulted in actual disciplinary
action. 7
1989 1995-1996 1996-1997 1997-1998
1. 9,712 11,835 12,075 12,741
2. 619 717 778 672
3. 83 93 108 112
4. 36 39 40 40
84 Id. at 797.
11 See Letter from Edie Armstrong, Bar Counsel Paralegal, Kentucky Bar
Association, to Parker Eastin, KentuckyLawJournal (Nov. 10, 1998) (on file with
author); see also supra Part I.B.
86 The numbers indicate only the total number of complaints filed, as separate
records are not maintained that record the number of complaints filed by attorneys.
87 Pursuant to SCR 3.150(1) "... . nothing connected with a disciplinary
case shall be made public unless so ordered by the Court," therefore, the
figures below reflect only final public orders issued by the Supreme Court
of Kentucky. These statistics do not include private sanctions which [have
been] imposed. These figures are based on a fiscal year which ends in June.
Letter from Edie Armstrong to Parker Eastin, supra note 85.
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These statistics demonstrate that over the last three years, an average
of about one in seventeen attorneys licensed to practice law in Kentucky
had a disciplinary complaint filed against him or her.88 Of the complaints
filed, an average of about one in seven actually led to disciplinary
proceedings.89 Of the complaints that led to disciplinary proceedings, an
average of about one in 2.5 resulted in public disciplinary action." Thus,
on average, only one in every eighteen complaints filed against lawyers in
Kentucky culminated in public disciplinary action. Summarily stated, an
average of six percent of Kentucky's lawyers had complaints filed against
them annually, but only about five percent of these complaints result in
public disciplinary measures. Interestingly, the numbers generated in 1989,
the year following the decision in In re Himmel,91 are consistent with recent
Kentucky averages, 2 which indicates that the decision had relatively little,
if any, effect on the frequency of reporting in this state.93
m. SHOULD KENTUCKY ADOPT AN
EXPRESS REPORTING REQUIREMENT?
A. Problems with Adopting Model Rule 8.3
Whether the imposition of the Model Rules reporting requirement
would benefit the profession in Kentucky is debatable. Assuming the
Kentucky Supreme Court were to adopt Model Rule 8.3, 94 there are several
88 The numbers for each individual year are as follows: 1995-96, 1 in 16.5;
1996-97, 1 in 15.5; and 1997-98, 1 in 18.9. See id.89 The numbers for each individual year are as follows: 1995-96, 1 in 7.7; 1996-
97, 1 in 7.2; and 1997-98, 1 in 6. See id.
10 The numbers for each individual year are as follows: 1995-96,1 in 2.4; 1996-
97, 1 in 2.7; and 1997-98, 1 in 2.8. See id.
91 See supra Part I.B.
9 The numbers for 1989 are as follows: 1 in 15.7 lawyers had complaints filed
against them; 1 in 7.5 of these complaints lead to disciplinary proceedings; and 1
in 2.3 of these proceedings lead to public disciplinary measures. See Letter from
Edie Armstrong to Parker Eastin, supra note 85.
9 See generally Burwick, supra note 39, at 147 (similarly arguing that there
was no statistically significant change in the prevalence of meritorious complaints
in Illinois after the Himmel decision); see also supra note 64.
9 Rule 8.3 provides in its entirety:
Reporting Professional Misconduct
(a) A lawyer having knowledge that another lawyer has committed a
violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct that raises a substantial
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questions that remain unanswered but need to be resolved before effective
implementation could occur.95 These include but are not limited to: (1)
what constitutes a violation of the Kentucky Rules of Professional
Conduct?; 96 (2) which of these violations would constitute "substantial"
violations under the "new" Kentucky Rule 8.3?; 97 (3) what level of
knowledge would be required under the Kentucky Rules before reporting
would be mandated?; 98 and (4) what information is confidential under the
Kentucky Rules?99 Furthermore, once these four questions are answered,
careful consideration must be given to a fifth question: (5) how do we
prevent abuse of the reporting requirement (i.e., its use as a tactical weapon
by opposing counsel)?"°
1. What Constitutes Professional Misconduct?
Model Rule 8.4,11 the catch-all rule defining the parameters of
professional misconduct, provides in pertinent part that "[i]t is professional
question as to that lawyer's honesty, trustworthiness or fitness as a lawyer
in other respects, shall inform the appropriate professional authority.
(b) A lawyer having knowledge that a judge has committed a violation
of applicable rules of judicial conduct that raises a substantial question as
to the judge's fitness for office shall inform the appropriate authority.
(c) This Rule does not require disclosure of information otherwise pro-
tected by Rule 1.6 or information gained by a lawyer or judge while serving
as a member of an approved lawyers assistance program to the extent such
information would be confidential if it were communicated subject to the
attorney-client privilege.
MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 8.3 (1998).
95 See Burwick, supra note 39, at 153.
96 See id.
97 See id.
98 See id.
99 See id.
10 See id.
101 Rule 8.4 provides in its entirety:
Misconduct
It is professional misconduct for a lawyer to:
(a) violate or attempt to violate the Rules of Professional Conduct,
knowingly assist or induce another to do so, or do so through the acts of
another,
(b) commit a criminal act that reflects adversely on the lawyer's
honesty, trustworthiness or fitness as a lawyer in other respects;
1998-99) 1285
KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
misconduct for a lawyer to... violate or attempt to violate the Rules of
Professional Conduct,... commit a criminal act that reflects adversely on
the lawyer's honesty, trustworthiness or fitness as a lawyer,... [or] engage
in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation."''
Kentucky's formulation of this rule is nearly identical to Model Rule 8.4.13
The breadth of what constitutes professional misconduct under the
Kentucky Rules, therefore, is clear: everything from client neglect to armed
robbery. All of the conduct would be subject to a newly-adopted report-
ing requirement. However, there is an important limitation on the types
of misconduct a lawyer is responsible for reporting under the Model
Rules: only those actions which raise a substantial question as to that
lawyer's honesty, trustworthiness, or fitness to practice law should be
reported.
2. What Violations Constitute a "Substantial Question"?
The obvious implication of the "substantial" requirement in Model
Rule 8.3 is that not all violations of professional conduct rules should be
reported.3 4 The comment to Model Rule 8.3 provides some assistance by
pointing out that whether a "substantial question" is raised depends upon
the seriousness of the violation and not upon the amount of evidence
known by the reporting lawyer. 0 5 The comment specifically provides that
Model Rule 8.3 "limits the reporting obligation to those offenses that a
(c) engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or mis-
representation;
(d) engage in conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of
justice;
(e) state or imply an ability to influence improperly a government
agency or official; or
(f) knowingly assist a judge or judicial officer in conduct that is a
violation of applicable rules of judicial conduct or other law.
MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 8.4 (1998).
102 Id.
103 See KY. SUP. CT. 1. 3.130-8.3. The Kentucky Supreme Court chose to delete
subsection (d) when it adopted Model Rule 8.4 as Kentucky's Rule 8.3. This
subsection was a general prohibition on engaging in conduct prejudicial to the
administration of justice. See Gaetke, supra note 16, at 781 n.97 (generally
applauding the deletion of subsection (d) but discussing a-few potentially negative
ramifications).
" See Michael Daigneault, Am IMy Brother's Keeper?, 43 FED. LAW. 9, 10
(1996).
105 See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 8.3 cmt
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self-regulating profession must vigorously endeavor to prevent."'' 6 As
defined under the Kentucky Rules, the word "'substantial' when used in
reference to degree or extent denotes a material matter of clear and weighty
importance."' 7 A measure of judgment, therefore, would be required in
complying with the provisions of this rule.' "The conversion of client
funds, the forgery of a signature, or the conviction for a felony offense, are
examples of a substantial breach."'" Less clear are situations involving
drug or alcohol abuse, sexual relations with clients, or other situations
involving legal but immoral behavior n 10
The practical insufficiency of the definition and commentary is
obvious. Therefore, a more transparent, administrable standard should be
adopted. This could be achieved by the adoption of a nonexclusive but
lengthy list of common instances of lawyer misconduct and its appropriate
classification (i.e., those violations that tend to raise a substantial question
and those that do not),"' or perhaps by a more detailed definition of
"substantial."" 2 At the same time, the "substantial question" determination
obviously places a great deal of importance on a lawyer's own judgment,
but as a lawyer must make important decisions on a daily basis, this should
not create an insurmountable impediment.
3. What Level of Knowledge is Required?
Assuming a particular violation raises a"substantial question" as to the
lawyer's fitness to practice law, what is the appropriate quantum of
knowledge required before the duty to report is triggered? Must knowledge
of another lawyer's misconduct rise to the level of certainty? According to
the Terminology section of the Model Rules, "'knowingly,' 'known,' or
'knows' denotes actual knowledge of the fact in question."'' Significantly,
06 Id.
107 KY. SUP. CT. R. 3.130 Terminology.
'o' See id.
11 Thomas M. Carpenter, A Question ofDuty and Honor, The Requirement to
Report Lawyers Who Violate the Code, ARK. LAW., Winter 1995, at 16, 18.
11 See id.
.But see Gendry, supra note 66, at 609-10 (discussing the practical problems
of attempting to create such a list and concluding that such a list would either be
"extraordinarily long or underinclusive").
12 Gendry suggests that the bar should provide more detailed guidelines for
making such a determination. See id. at 610.
13 MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Terminology (1998). The
Kentucky Rules of Professional Conduct borrow this definition verbatim. See KY.
1998-99] 1287
KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
the section further provides that "[a] person's knowledge may be inferred
from circumstances. 114 The Rules, therefore, do not insist on actual
knowledge.'15 Unfortunately, neither the Model Rules nor the Kentucky
Rules offer other helpful criteria for determining adequacy of"knowledge,"
though it remains clear that the drafters "do not want lawyers reporting
lawyers on the basis of rumor or speculation.""' 6 Thus, under the current
definition, the required knowledge must go beyond suspicion or rumor but
need not be actual knowledge.
117
The adoption ofeither ahigherthresholdrequirement for "knowledge,"
such as clear and convincing knowledge of the fact in question, or of a
relatively low standard, such as reasonable suspicion, would alleviate much
of the confusion surrounding the obtuse "knowledge" requirement currently
utilized. 11 To encourage meritorious claims, however, the higher threshold
would be preferable." 9
4. What Information Is "Confidential"
and Therefore Not Subject to Disclosure?
Determining the boundaries of confidential information is important
because of the exception created in Model Rule 8.3(c), which provides:
"This rule does not require disclosure of information otherwise protected
by Rule 1.6." 102 Model Rule 1.6 is intended to establish what information
possessedby lawyers is confidential (i.e., protected informationthat should
not be disclosed).' Model Rule 1.6 provides generally that "[a] lawyer
Sup. CT. R. 3.130 Terminology.
"4 MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Terminology; KY. SbP. CT. R.
3.130 Terminology (emphasis added).
"5 See Daigneault, supra note 104, at 10.
16 Carpenter, supra note 109, at 16.
17 See Daigneault, supra note 104, at 10. But see Burwick, supra note 39, at
142 (noting that in some jurisdictions "even uncertain suspicions should be
reported") (citing Cleveland Bar Ass'n Prof I Ethics Comm., Op. 85-1 (1985)).
" See Burwick, supra note 39, at 153-54.
"1 This higher requirement would also mesh well with the prohibitive KY. SUP.
CT. R. 3.4(f). See supra Part II.A.
120 MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 8.3(c) (1998).
121 See id. Rule 1.6. The Kentucky counterpart to Model Rule 1.6 is Kentucky
Rule 1.6, Confidentiality of Information. Kentucky's version is the same as the
Model Rules formulation with one insignificant addition. See KY. SUP. CT. K.
3.130-1.6.
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shall not reveal information relating to representation of a client."'"
The comment to Model Rule 1.6 makes clear the extent to which the
umbrella of confidentiality should apply, as it states that "confidentiality"
encompasses information protectedbyboththe attorney/client privilege (as
established by the law of evidence) and the general rule of confi-
dentiality (as established by the law of ethics)." Thus, lawyers should not
report misconduct that they learned aboutthrough confidential communica-
tion.
However, Model Rule 1.6 identifies four exceptions to this general
prohibition on disclosure." The four exceptions are: (1) when the client,
after consultation, agrees to the disclosure;125 (2) when disclosure is
"impliedly authorized in order to carry out the representation;1 2 6 (3) when
the disclosure is necessary to prevent the commission of a future crime
"likely to result in imminent death or substantial bodily harm;"'27 and (4)
when the disclosure is necessary to "establish a claim or defense" in a
dispute between the lawyer and client and "to establish a defense to a
criminal charge or civil claim against the lawyer based upon conduct in
which the client was involved or to respond to allegations in any proceed-
ing concerning the lawyer's representation of the client."'2 8 These are four
specific situations in which the duty not to disclose confidential informa-
tion is overcome by other professional responsibilities. 2 9 Ultimately, this
means that the exception under Model Rule 8.3 for information protected
by Model Rule 1.6 would not apply in these four distinct situations.
Therefore, a lawyer representing another lawyer in such matters is
most likely not under an obligation to reveal the represented lawyer's
misconduct. 13 Unfortunately, where this bar to disclosure falls in other
122 MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.6(a).
' See id. Rule 1.6 cmt.
S24 ee id. Rule 1.6.
See id. Rule 1.6(a).
12 Id.
127 Id. Rule 1.6(b).
128 Id.
29 See Daigneault, supra note 104, at 10. The Kentucky rule also explicitly
authorizes disclosure of confidential information "to comply with other law or a
court order." KY. SUP. CT. R. 3.130-1.6(3). However, this additional exception is
insignificant in light of the fact that the comments to Model Rule 1.6 provide for
the same result. See Gaetke, supra note 16, at 777-78 (noting that "[tihe Kentucky
rule is preferable, but it does not alter the likely practical effect" of Model Rule
1.6).
'30 See Carpenter, supra note 109, at 16.
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circumstances is less clear."' For example, in In re Himmel, Mr. Himmel
learned directly from and was asked directly by his client not to report the
other lawyer's conversion of client funds. 2 This seems to indicate that the
communication was privileged and therefore protected from disclosure.
13 1
It presumably would have been except for the fact that Mr. Himmel
obtained permission from his client to discuss the case with outside
parties.3 4 The court found that Mr. Himmel had talked to too many people
about the misconduct, including the client's mother, fiane6, and an
insurance company attorney.
135
The adoption of a broader concept of confidentiality with respect to the
potential disclosure of lawyer misconduct, one that would protect lawyers
in 'Himmelesque" situations, would be both appropriate and remedial.3 6
This would ensure greater client confidentiality and provide lawyers with
a clearer understanding of the types of disclosures that should remain
protected notwithstanding the reporting requirement.
5. How Do We Prevent Abuse?
The fear that reporting misconduct would be used as a weapon in
litigation is a strong argument against implementing an official reporting
requirement. 3 1 The possibility that an unscrupulous attorney might make
unfounded allegations in orderto gain a competitive advantage is arealistic
consideration and one that must be dealt with before adoption of a
reporting requirement is feasible. However, those in favor of a reporting
requirement can attempt to allay this fear on two grounds. First, such fears
assume that many lawyers are eagerly awaiting an opportunity to abuse the
process and will seize the opportunity to comply with a reporting require-
131 See id.
32 See In re Himmel, 533 N.E.2d 790, 792 (Ill. 1988).
133 See Carpenter, supra note 109, at 16.
13 See id.
131 See In re Himmel, 533 N.E.2d at 794.
1
36 See Burwick, supra note 39, at 153; see also In re Ethics Advisory Panel
Opinion, 627 A.2d 317 (R.I. 1993) (discussing the tension between protecting
client confidences and the duty to report professional misconduct and concluding
a lawyer should obtain client consent before reporting another lawyer's misconduct
that he learned about from the client).
131 See ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. 94-
383 (1994) (recognizing the problem and recommending postponement of the
reporting until the conclusion of the case).
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ment. This predisposition is not commensurate with the professionalism
expected of and exhibited by most licensed practitioners of law in
Kentucky. There have been no studies suggesting that abuse is currently a
problem or that it will become one following the adoption of a reporting
requirement.' Second, Rule 3.4(f), the existing rule designed to deal with
this problem, is in and of itself defective as a deterrent because of its
narrow language, and thus should be repealed and replaced with a more
effective alternative.
Rule 3.4(f) provides that no lawyer shall "[p]resent, participate in
presenting, or threaten to present criminal or disciplinary charges solely to
obtain an advantage in any civil or criminal matter."'3 What about lawyers
who report other lawyers' professional misconductprimarily orprincipally
to gain such an advantage? Are they not equally culpable? It seems
plausible to assume that any lawyer willing to behave in such a manner as
to bring Rule 3A(f) into play would certainly be able to come up with a
more civic-minded reason as well, thus avoiding any liability for bringing
such a charge "solely" to gain an advantage. 4°
Through the adoption of an official reporting requirement, as well as
by broadening Rule 3.4(f) to include those who report or threaten to report
"primarily" or "principally" or even "in part" to obtain an advantage, the
court could send a strong message to the bar and public alike. Finally,
abuse can be avoided by imposing a mandatory stay of all disciplinary
proceedings brought immediately prior to or during litigation unless
exigent circumstances warrant an immediate investigation. Close scrutiny
of any complaint filed by a lawyer at such an inopportune time should also
ensue.
B. A Problematic Setting Under Model Rule 8.3
When the relationship between two lawyers is adversarial, it will
presumably be easier for a lawyer to choose to report the other. 4 ' When
two lawyers are practicing together in a firm, however, a completely
different set of dynamics comes into play.'42 Therefore, an important
setting in which clear standards for reporting need to be developed is the
138 The author at least has failed to locate any such evidence.
39 KY. Sup. CT. R. 3.130-3.4(f) (emphasis added).
140 Id.
141 So easy, in fact, that this is likely where the fear of abuse originates.
141 Other potentially difficult situations arise when the lawyers are relatives,
spouses, practice together in a public office, and the like.
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private law firm. Assuming a lawyer has the requisite knowledge of a
violation that raises a "substantial question" about another lawyer
practicing in the same firm, what is the lawyer's appropriate course of
conduct? The lawyer's duty to report the offending individual is clear
under Model Rule 8.3, for it unequivocally provides that "[a] lawyer having
knowledge that another lawyer has committed a violation of the Rules of
Professional Conduct that raises a substantial question as to that lawyer's
honesty, trustworthiness or fitness as a lawyer in other respects, shall
inform the appropriate professional authority. '144 The rule makes no
exception for lawyers practicing together in firms other than not requiring
disclosure if such information is protected by confidentiality (Rule 1.6) or
is learned pursuant to participation in a lawyer's assistance program. 4 '
Confidential information is generally created by an attorney/client
relationship, so only a lawyer representing another lawyer in the matter
would be immune from the disclosure requirement. The exception for
information learnedthrough participation in a lawyer's assistance program,
presumably designed to encourage offending lawyers to confide in other
participants or facilitators and seek their counsel, would only apply in very
narrow circumstances."4 Assuming the absence of either an attorney/client
relationship or a lawyer's participation in an assistance program, the
lawyer's obligation to report the offending individual appears to be
absolute.
Nevertheless, it seems logical to assume that, within a law firm setting,
other considerations would be weighed by the attorney before he or she
would automatically adhere to the reporting requirement. One cannot forget
that lawyers in firms are often friends, count on each other for continued
economic viability, and share the risk that public disclosure of a rotten
apple might indirectly spoil the bunch. Thus, a lawyer might hesitate to
report misconduct out of a feeling of loyalty or dedication to the firm or its
members. More disturbing, however, is that some lawyers will hesitate
based on the fear they will either be discriminated against or outright
ostracized by the firm and on the belief that the professional consequences
of reporting simply outweigh the potential benefits. Since lawyers
practicing together are often the only ones with access to the information
indicating misconduct, they may feel that they face a greater danger "of
14I See Daigneault, supra note 104, at 10; MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL
CONDUCT Rule 8.3 (1998).
'"MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 8.3(a) (emphasis added).
141 See id. Rule 8.3(c).
146See id.
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discovery and retaliation."' 47 Furthermore, as In re Himmel 48 remains one
of the few cases on record subjecting a lawyer to discipline solely for
failing to report misconduct, the lawyer might feel that the minute risk of
discipline is worth taking in light of the other, potentially devastating,
professional consequences. Presumably, certain ethical violations will
garner more sympathy from colleagues than others (e.g., the unfortunate
alcoholic versus the conniving thief). Assuming a more sympathetic
violation, the lawyer might prefer to discuss the problem with the offending
lawyer and privately suggest ways either to alleviate or remedy the
situation. 4 9 Alternatively, the lawyer might choose to discuss the circum-
stances with the firm's management in an effort to rectify the problem
while maintaining firm privacy. 5' Thus, although Model Rule 8.3 clearly
requires disclosure in most instances, the reality of the law firm environ-
ment justifies further inquiry.
An important case in this area is Wieder v. Skala.'5 1 Wieder represents
the first case to "address the conflict between a lawyer's duty to report an
unethical colleague and a law firn's right to fire the reporting attorney in
retaliation for his disclosure."'" Howard Wieder was an associate with the
law firm of Feder, Kaszovitz, Isaacson, Weber & Skala.15 1 Mr. Wieder
asked the firm to do a real estate closing for him, and Larry Lubin, an
associate at the firm, was assigned to handle the transaction."S4 Mr. Wieder
subsequently discovered that Mr. Lubin had neglected his duties relating
to the transaction and had misrepresented to Mr. Wieder that the necessary
actions had been taken. Mr. Wieder ultimately "incurred nearly $27,000 in
additional financing costs" as a result of Mr. Lubin's misconduct.
55
Thereafter, Mr. Wieder reported Lubin's misconduct to the firm and
persistently asked that the firm comply with the professional conduct rules
'47 Gendry, supra note 66, at 606. Gendry notes that allowing anonymous re-
porting would alleviate some of the fear of retaliation but that such a system might
lead to abuse. See id. at 611-12.
148 See supra Part I.B.
149 See Daigneault, supra note 104, at 11.
150 See id.
1
5 Wiederv. Skala, 544 N.Y.S.2d 971 (Sup. Ct. 1989), affid, 562 N.Y.S.2d 930
(App. Div. 1990), affd as modified, 609 N.E.2d 105 (N.Y. 1992).
52 Blackwell, supra note 3, at 11.
'
51 See Wieder, 609 N.E.2d at 105-06.
'4See Blackwell, supra note 3, at 12.
'
55 Id. at 12-13.
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requiring disclosure. 156 The firm declined to do so and attempted to
discourage Wieder from filing such a report himself.'
7
Consequently, Wieder faced a serious dilemma: he could either honor
the firm's wishes and risk disciplinary action for failing to report the
misconduct, or, contrary to the firm's wishes, he could report the miscon-
duct and risk losing his job. 158 The firm eventually forced Mr. Lubin to
leave the firm and reported his misconduct to the appropriate tribunal.'59
About three months later, Mr. Wieder was fired pursuant to an at-will
employment contract, but allegedly in retaliation." Mr. Wieder thereafter
filed a wrongful discharge suit against Lubin and the firm's named
partners.' The trial court dismissed Wieder's wrongful discharge suit on
the grounds that the at-will employment doctrine conclusively resolved the
issue, a decision that was affirmed by the appellate division.62 After a
considerable amount ofprocedural wrangling, the Court of Appeals of New
York eventually agreed to re-examine the case. 63 The court ultimately
reaffirmed the employment at-will doctrine, but with respect to the facts at
issue, held for Wieder, as summarized by Anthony Blackwell:
When alaw firm hires an associate... "there is implied an understanding
so fundamental to the relationship and essential to its purpose as to require
no expression: that both the associate and the firm in conducting the
practice will do so in accordance with the ethical standards of the
profession." Thus, the court held that both Wieder and his firm were
contractually as well as ethically obligated to report intra-professional
misconduct ... Once the firm, as Wieder alleges, insisted that he "act
unethically and in violation of... [this] primary professional rule[l," it
intentionally took action to prevent Wieder from fulfilling his part of the
agreement. Accordingly, the Court of Appeals concluded that "[Wieder]
151 See id. at 13; Wieder, 609 N.E.2d at 106.
157 See Wieder, 609 N.E.2d at 106.
"I See Daigneault, supra note 104, at 11.
159 See Blackwell, supra note 3, at 13.
" See id. at 13-14. Generally speaking, at-will employment means an employ-
ment relationship characterized by the fact that it may be terminated at any time by
either the employer or the employee with or without cause. See Gendry, supra note
66, at 607.
161 See Blackwell, supra note 3, at 13.
62ee Wieder, 609 N.E.2d at 106-07.
163 See Blackwell, supra note 3, at 14-19.
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ha[d] stated avalid claim for breach of contract based upon an implied-in-
law obligation in his relationship with the defendants."' 4
Thus, the court in Wieder chose to protect a lawyer who sought to
honor his professional obligation to report the misconduct of his colleague
through an implied-in-law contractual obligation. Assuming a reporting
requirement is adopted in Kentucky, the state's courts must be cognizant
of the potential discrimination arising from reporting and should send a
similar message that retribution of any kind in such situations will not be
tolerated. The courts should also keep in mind the essential reporting role
that lawyers play in the firm context, as many violations are not easily
discovered by outsiders (such as conflicts of interest) and as clients are
often ignorant of what constitutes an ethical violation.6' Lawyers
practicing in firms are likely to be invaluable sources of information
concerning misconduct and, as such, must be vigilantly protected.
Ultimately, the court system must protect whistleblowers and can do
so by rendering decisions in these matters with an eye towards encouraging
individuals to honor their professional responsibilities. 6 Whether this will
be best achieved by reaffirming the implied-in-law contract theory from
Wieder or by creating some sort of public policy exception to the
employment-at-will doctrine for lawyers honoring their code of ethics 67 is
arguable. What is clear, though, is that "[a]ttorneys are much more likely
to report co-worker misconduct if they are assured that they will have their
day in court should their employer fire them for reporting the misconduct
of another attorney in the firm.'
' 68
Another important player in this dilemma is the law firm itself, since
"the ethical atmosphere of a firm can influence the conduct of all its
members.' ' 69 Law firms should therefore take the initiative to educate
employees about their ethical obligations and implement appropriate
guidelines and procedures to encourage the reporting of misconduct. 7 '
Lawyers should understand that their firm advocates reporting the
'64 Id. at 19-20 (quoting Wieder, 609 N.E.2d at 180, 110) (footnotes omitted).
16 See Gendry, supra note 66, at 609.
16 See id. at 614-16.
167 Such an exception was suggested in an article by Seymour Moskowitz. See
Seymour Moskowitz, Employment-at-Will & Code ofEthics: The Professional's
Dilemma, 23 VAL. U. L. REV. 33,44-46 (1988).
168 Gendry, supra note 66, at 615-16.
161 MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 5.1 cmt (1998).
.7 See Gendry, supra note 66, at 613.
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misconduct of co-workers and that no negative ramifications will ensue
upon a good faith filing of a complaint. 71 Such policies would serve to
encourage both loyal and intimidated lawyers to honor their ethical
obligations.
In conclusion, the law firm is undoubtedly an environment in which
disclosure of misconduct can be problematic. Some lawyers might hesitate
to report misconduct based on misguided loyalty to the firm. These lawyers
need to understand their indispensable role in the disciplinary process, and
they need to receive encouragement accordingly. 72 Also, it would be
imprudent to fail to recognize that lawyers who honor their obligation to
report professional misconduct "may not only embarrass and incur the
animus of the partners and associates in their own firms, but the effect
might carry over to other firms as well."n Such hostility "may manifest
itself in the form of retaliatory personnel action against the reporting
attorney, who may receive undesirable work assignments, be denied
partnership, or in the extreme, be summarily dismissed from the firm."''
Attorneys witnessing professional misconduct may be forced to decide
"between preserving their ethics or preserving their jobs."'7 No lawyer,
however, should face discrimination or termination for reporting profes-
sional misconduct in accordance with the legal profession's ethical
obligations. The legal community as a whole simply should not tolerate
such retribution.
C. Other Problematic Settings
There are various other situations that warrant discussion concerning
proper application of the reporting requirement, most of which go beyond
the scope of this Note. Briefly, though, attorneys serving as judges should
be equally obligated to report known instances of professional ethics
1'' Gendry discusses the possibility of including such information in the firm's
policy manual but concludes that most fimns would be unwilling to include such
language because it could provide the basis of a breach of contract action. See id.
172 In New York, for example, a "law firm" rule has been developed by the
courts whereby entire firms can be held liable for the misconduct of a single
"unknown" employee. Such a rule would probably encourage hesitant lawyers with
pertinent information to step forward. See Van Duch, supra note 59, at A25.
'7 Blackwell, supra note 3, at 10-11.
'
74 Id. at 11 (citing Wieder v. Skala, 544 N.Y.S.2d 971 (Sup. Ct. 1989), afid,
562 N.Y.S.2d 930 (App. Div. 1990), aff'd as modified, 609 N.E.2d 105 (N.Y.
1992)).
'75 Id.
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violations. Judges, because of their unique role in the judicial system, can
serve as valuable sources of misconduct reporting. Importantly, judges do
not encounter the same type of peer pressure as lawyers practicing in
private firms. Furthermore, given the fact that judges maintain a unique
vantage point from which they can observe the conduct of lawyers, judicial
insight and experience could serve as valuable tools in policing misconduct
since certain ethical matters are too complicated for the average client to
understand. The relative unreliability of client complaints due to their
(understandable) ignorance of professional ethics, coupled with the
hesitation undeniably felt by lawyers practicing in private firms, makes the
judge's potential role in the disciplinary process paramount.
CONCLUSION
Little can be done to reconcile the general distaste for snitching on
colleagues with the clear need to maintain discipline and high standards
within the legal profession. The debate essentially comes down to a
prioritization of fundamental values. We must ask ourselves as a profes-
sion, where we choose to draw the proverbial line. Does the very integrity
of the legal profession and the right of self-regulation depend on lawyers
honoring the duty to report fellow misconduct? 76 Or is the profession
better served by not encouraging the kind of animosity that could follow
from such a reporting requirement? The answer is uncertain, but as a
primarily self-regulated profession,"7 do we owe it to the public and
ourselves to police ourselves in this manner?
As stated in an article found in theAmerican BarFoundation Research
Journal, the policy goals behind imposing such a duty to report are
threefold: "(1) to identify and remove from the profession all seriously
deviant members (the 'cleansing function'); (2) to deter normative
deviance and maximize compliance with norms among attorneys (the
'deterrence function'); and (3) to maintain a level of response to deviance
sufficient to forestallpublic dissatisfaction (the 'pubic image function')."'7 8
These three objectives seem quite sound and should be carefully contem-
plated by the Kentucky Supreme Court the next time the reporting
'76 See Carpenter, supra note 109, at 18.
1
77 See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT 8.3 cmt. (1998); see also
Rotunda, supra note 25, at 992.
178 Eric H. Steele & Raymond T. Nimmer, Lawyers, Clients and Professional
Regulation, 1976 AM. B. FOUND. RES. .917, 999-1014.
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requirement is proposed. Furthermore, as is clearly explained in the
Preamble to the Model Rules,
[t]he legal profession's relative autonomy carries with it special responsi-
bilities of self-government. The profession has a responsibility to assure
that its regulations are conceived m the public interest and not m
furtherance of parochial or self-interested concerns of the bar. Every
lawyer is responsible for observance oftheRules ofProfessional Conduct
A lawyer should also aid m securing their observance by other lawyers.
Neglect of these responsibilities compromises the independence of the
profession and the public interest which it serves.
179
In order to maintain the privilege of policing ourselves, lawyers should
accept the responsibility of scrupulously enforcingthe rules ofprofessional
conduct. 180 Despite the arguments against the imposition of such a duty,
there exist strong arguments in its favor. One must consider the intangible
benefits to the profession that would result from the decision to require
reporting. Such a decisionwould denote professionalism andresponsibility
by demonstrating both to the bar and the public that misconduct will not be
tolerated and will be disclosed in the interests of the public and the
profession. Forty-eight other states have seen fit to impose such a
requirement. It seems it is time for the Kentucky Supreme Court to adopt
and enforce the duty to report professional misconduct.
179 MODEL RULES OFPROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Preamble. The Preamble was not
adopted by the Kentucky Supreme Court.
"8' See generally Gaetke, supra note 16, at 798 ("To the public it must be hard
to imagine the rationale for calling the practice of law a self-regulating profession
when lawyers are perfectly free to remain silent even in the face of grossly
unethical conduct on the part of other lawyers.").
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